Asia House’s The Middle East Pivot to Asia 2025 states that Gulf sovereign wealth funds deployed an estimated US$56 billion globally in the first nine months of 2025, with 40% of it directed toward Asia. The same report gives a second Asia share, 17%, and attaches a different 40% to the Gulf funds’ weight in global sovereign activity. The headline number needs a definition before it goes into a pitch deck.
Lead figure
The executive summary says the Gulf’s SWFs “deployed an estimated US$56 billion globally in the first nine months of 2025 – 40 per cent of which was directed toward Asia”. The sentence carries no source note. The report dates its own text to October 2025 (“At the time of writing in October 2025”), so the figure was written up within weeks of the window closing. The wording marks it as an estimate.
What is measured
The report holds three separate figures that readers merge into one:
- 40% toward Asia. Stated in the executive summary as a share of the Gulf funds’ US$56 billion total.
- 17% to Asia. The Outlook says “Gulf SWF allocations to Asia have climbed to 17 per cent in 2025”. The investment chapter gives “Asia’s share of allocations rising to 17 per cent, up from 12 per cent in 2022”, credits fDi Intelligence (2025), and adds that “China, Hong Kong and India are leading destinations”.
- 40% of global activity. The investment chapter says the Gulf funds “accounted for 40 per cent of global activity, deploying US$56.3 billion across 97 transactions”, crediting Global SWF.
The third figure measures origin: the Gulf’s share of worldwide state-investor dealmaking. It shares the 40% and the roughly US$56 billion base with the headline but says nothing about destination.
Interpretation
Two readings fit the text. Either the executive summary moved the 40% global share onto Asia, or the Asia split comes from a separate cut of Global SWF data that the report does not show. The report does not say which. The 40% and 17% cannot both be Asia’s share of the same pool over the same period unless they differ in scope, such as the definition of Asia or the treatment of domestic deals.
The investment chapter’s only table, “Table 6 – 2025 allocations by Gulf SWF”, lists totals by fund and has no destination column, so the Asia share cannot be rebuilt from the document. The report also does not define Asia for the SWF figures. For trade it uses an Emerging Asia list that “excludes advanced Asian economies such as Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Australia, and New Zealand”, yet its leading SWF destinations include Hong Kong.
Why it matters for the corridor: A deck that opens with 40% rests on a figure the same report does not reconcile with its 17%. Only the 17% has a named source and a prior-year comparator, 12% in 2022.
Data limits
- Global SWF is the stated source for the totals. Its 2025 MENA Playbook is open to full subscribers only (“This content is only visible to Full Subscribers”).
- The report does not define “deployed”: announced, signed and funded amounts are different series. The 97 is a count of transactions, not a value.
- The 17% is attributed to fDi Intelligence (2025).
- The sources do not show the destination table behind the 40%, Global SWF’s Asia definition and regional split for the same nine months, or the scope of the 17%.
Editorial assessment
These points are judgement calls by the desk, not conclusions drawn from the deal announcements.
- Use the 17%, with its source and its 2022 comparator, as the citable Asia share until a destination table for the 40% is published.
- Treat the 40% as a stated Gulf share of global sovereign activity, which the investment chapter states, and not as an Asia share until Asia House reconciles it.
- State the measure beside the number in any deck: share of what, over which months, from which source.